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Over the past four decades, God has blessed me with the intervention into
my life of several very special people whom I would consider 'mentors'-
individuals who have made a significant enrichment to my career and
personal development. One such special person is Roberto MacLean, with
whom I have had the great pleasure and honour of working as a colleague
and of enjoying as a friend for over the past two decades. If there is one
word I would ascribe to Roberto, it would be 'passionate'. Indeed, Roberto
is a man of not only perpetual enthusiasm and optimism, but of boundless
'love' that he brings to the 'table of life'. Whether the subject is the law,
history, nature, archaeology, religion, poetry, music, good food and wine,
good company-whatever would be before him-Roberto would bring a
special contagious passion. Even more importantly, he would bring this
special passion to the people with whom he came into contact in his sojourn
through life-his family, friends, work colleagues and students. In our
current era of technical specialists, Roberto stands out as a true humanist
of enormous integrity and of a deep concern about the world he lives in and
the diverse humans who populate our globe.
Whenever I would feel overwhelmed by the mundaneness and special-
ization of my own work and profession, I could always look to Roberto for
inspiration and hope. Though a consummate lawyer and international-class
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the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law, 9-12 Aug 2006, Austin, Texas.
A modified article version of this Chapter will appear as an article in an upcoming 2007 issue
of the Texas International Law Journal.
Taking in the 'Excluded' 193
legal scholar with an enormous breadth of real life experience (Law Dean,
Judge, Central Banker, Ambassador, Judicial Specialist, Arbitrator),
Roberto would weave the positive importance of law as a most positive
human and even more so a Divine creation for the betterment of our local
and global society. For Roberto, law is not about obstacles or rigid rules,
but about a vibrant societal fabric that is (or should be) always linked to
societal improvement and especially to social justice. One would only have
to listen to Roberto in one of his student seminars, public lectures or private
conversations to hear these same resounding notes of passion and hope. To
Roberto, we are all on the same 'Ark' travelling the same voyage of life.
And, though, Roberto is a great realist who knows and who can see the
great pains and hardship of our individual and collective lives-in the past,
present and future-he always sees the voyage as a most worthwhile one
where good people, with good ideas and particularly good hearts prevail
ultimately. In this communal voyage, law--good laws, good legal systems,
good lawyers, good law teachers-would serve as both vibrant glue and an
honest compass for finding and keeping the good path.
Thank you Roberto for being such a good and kind mentor to me-and
in sharing your passion, your hope and your wonderful humour with me
over the years, and I look forward to sharing many more good years with
you, Renee and your family.
I. INTRODUCTION
Approximately two-thirds of the world's population is effectively excluded
from mainstream banking/financial sectors of their respective countries,
thus, precluding them from an ability to meet basic financial needs, from
any realistic prospects of wealth creation and foregoing the mainstream
financial system in these countries from more fully maturing in the sense of
contributing more fully to the developmental needs of these countries.
Thus, a critical, foundational issue that needs to be addressed respecting
banking reform issues in developing countries is that of 'inclusion'-inclu-
sion of the 'excluded' in an equitable manner.
The primary proposition being set forth in this chapter is that, notwith-
standing the plethora of global banking sector reform over the past two
decades, the equitable and accessible provision of banking services has
never found its way to being considered a core component to modern bank-
ing sector legal reform and assessment in the developing world. As such,
before one can sensibly talk about a viable banking/financial sector frame-
work in a developing country, there needs to be developed a reasonably
broad user base. In effect, the banking and financial system of the develop-
ing country needs to come to be accessible to the 'excluded': serving just the
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needs of the top of economic pyramid is short-sighted and, in the long-term,
counterproductive. While this conclusion seems to be obvious, it is only
most recently that the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), particu-
larly the World Bank, have begun to more systematically address these
fundamental deficiencies in developmental legal reform agendas respecting
the banking/ financial sector.
1
From this author's perspective of over two decades of study and practi-
cal involvement with financial sector reform in developing, transitioning
and emerging economies, he is of the considered view (i) that the modern
banking/financial sector law reform policies and infrastructures process is
really of relatively recent vintage; (ii) that the reform process has been
largely crisis-oriented and reactive by necessity and has become driven
largely by the industrialized-country systemic objectives of prevention of
financial crises and related contagion, the fostering of global financial
stability and (more recently) also the maintenance of financial sector
integrity; and (iii) that this 'first generation' of reform has never had the
'luxury' of being clearly thought through in terms of how developmental
factors such as access, equality and user protection can be incorporated into
the overall financial sector legal reform processes in an integrated and
coherent manner so as favourably to impact and to promote the United
Nations' Millennium Development Goal of alleviation of poverty. 2
It is the general view of this author that the future banking/financial
sector legal policy and infrastructure reform process for the IFIs and others
in the economic development arena should systematically and thoughtfully
undertake this reform process within or alongside a complementary frame-
I Certain abbreviations and acronyms used in this article include: AML-anti-moneylaun-
dering; BSCS or Basel Committee-Basel Committee on Banking Supervision or Basel
Committee; BIS-Bank for International Settlement; CAS-World Bank's Country Assessment
Strategies; CGAP-Consultative Group for Assisting the Poorest; CTF-counter-terrorism
financing; EBRD-European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; EU-European
Union; FATF-Financial Action Task Force; FSA-Financial Sector Assessment; FSAP-
Financial Sector Assessment Program; FSLC-IMF's Bank Financial Sector Liaison
Committee; FSF-Financial Stability Forum; G/7-Group of 7; G/8-Group of Eight; G-10-
Group of Ten; G-20--Group of Twenty; GATS--General Agreement on Trade in Services;
JADI-International Association of Deposit Insurers; IAIS-International Association of
Insurance Supervisors; IASC-International Accounting Standards Committee; IFAC-
International Federation of Accountants; IFA-International Financial Arrangement; IFC-
International Finance Corporation; IFI-International Financial Institution; IMF-
International Monetary Fund; IOSCO--International Organization of Securities
Commissions; JF-Joint Forum; LVP-Legal Vice Presidency of the World Bank; MFI-
Microfinance Institutions; NIFA-New International Financial Architecture; OECD-
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development; RFI-Regional Financial
Institution; ROSC-Reports on Observance on Standards and Codes; SME-Small and
Medium-sized Enterprises; WB or World Bank-International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development; WTO--World Trade Organization.
2 See generally UN Millennium Development Goals, http-/www.unmillenniumproject. org
(accessed 17 Oct 2006).
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work and context of meaningful and relevant economic-social development
policy objectives, including the object of making the financial base broader
and more inclusive. Quite simply, such reform should be coordinated, on
the policy, implementation and assessment levels, with the broader
economic development objectives and policies of the particular developing
country. 3
Part II of this chapter will attempt to evaluate banking sector legal
reform efforts as to developing countries over the past decade and a half.
Part M will consider selective recent efforts of the World Bank in address-
ing the access and equity issues respecting the banking sector. Part V will
consider two current developments of relevance: the rise of microfinancing
and the efforts to engage private industry cooperative efforts. Part V will
provide some concluding reflections on the importance of the legal infra-
structural, institutional and policy reorientation dimensions of such reform
efforts.
n1. EVALUATING BANKING SECTOR LEGAL REFORM FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
THE PAST DECADE AND A HALF
Banking sector legal reform as a mandate for domestic and international
financial authorities of developing countries is clearly of recent vintage, and
is largely the reactive by-product of the concern of the major industrialized
countries over financial crises and the quest for global financial stability
during the 1990s,4 the earlier collapse of the Soviet Empire and the new
'transitioning economies, the enlargement of the European Union and the
ongoing onslaught of economic globalization--each of which are intercon-
nected in various ways'. 5 More specifically, this reform over the past decade
has been largely driven by the G7/G8 grouping of industrialized countries.
3 As will be pointed out throughout this paper, modem 'financial sector development' is
not necessarily consistent with or supportive of what should be a developing country's broader
,economic development' planning and policies. cf T Thorsten, A Demirguc-Kunt, and M
Soledad Martinez Peria, Reach Out: Access and Use of Banking Services Across Countries,
World Bank, Development Research Group, Finance Team, Policy Research Paper 3754
(Washington, DC, 2005).
4 In fact, when one reviews the annual intergovernmental Communiques of the G-71G-8
from the 1975 through the mid-1990s, one notes, by conspicuous absence, that the financial
sector infrastructure (including its legal dimensions) is left unintended. Macro-economic issues
of ilobal significance were the rule of the day for the annual agendas.
It is true one can find specific anecdotal examples of financial law-related reforms during
the 1960s and 1970s but these were largely one-off and isolated reforms designed to facilitate
a certain development project. An IFI-related example was in the early years of the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) which views itself more as an International
Finance Corporation (lFC)-type of commercially oriented development institution: in the
1990s any institutional or legal reform in its mandate countries was specifically project-
focused. It was only, by the mid 1990s that the ERRD set-up a law reform component of its
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A. Modern Banking Sector Legal Reform as G7/G8 Mandated and as
Part of NIFA
In terms of becoming a major concern of the IFs, banking sector and other
financial sector legal reform as to developing countries began to gain
credence and to take shape as part of the G-7/ G-8 6 invention of the notion
of a 'New International Financial Architecture' (NIFA) a decade or so ago.
7
The NIFA in fact is a misnomer of sorts and in some sense a public relation
ploy to dress-over an ongoing quandary of what to do with an international
financial 'non-system'. 8 Yet, even if no true 'architecture' ever pre-existed
to be replaced by NIFA and though NIFA is itself probably not a true archi-
tecture or system, there did come to exist through the NIFA a working-base
from which a new architecture and a next generation of banking/financial
sector legal reform could be developed.
NIFA, as it has unfolded through the various G7/G8 annual Summits
over the past decade, has endeavoured to coordinate and to direct a wide
grouping of different, though related, international bodies that had their
own 'mandates,' 'jurisdictions' and 'powers': (i) multilateral agencies (IMF,
WB, BIS, OECD)9 (ii) policy formulation groups (G7/G8, G10, G20) 10 and
(iii) international regulatory and standard setting authorities and arrange-
ments (IFAs) (Basel Committee, IAIS, IOSCO, IASC, JF, FSF). 11 In addition,
in various and increasing ways, NIFA has brought into the 'equation' the
General Counsel's Office and tended to look at more generic law reform issues, such as a
model secured transaction law. See, eg, J Norton and M Andenas (eds), Secured Transactions
and Emerging Economies (Kluwer, 1997). Also, see generally J Norton, Financial Sector Law
Reform in Emerging Economies (London: BHCL, 2003).
6 Inaugurated in 1975 by the then Heads of the French and German Governments for the
purpose of creating a more meaningful forum for Heads of State Summits of the major indus-
.rialized countries, the G-8 (until from 1976 until 1998 when Russia was fully admitted, the
G-7) has met annually to consider the major global macro-economic and political issues. See
the major G-8 information centre website maintained by the University of Toronto:
httD://www.g7.utoronto.ca (accessed 21 Sept 2006).
' The first use of the specific term 'New International Financial Architecture' is often
attributed to Mr Michael Camdessus, former Managing Director of the IMF, who began regu-
larly to use this term in 1998 (eg, Michel Camdessus, 'Toward a New Financial Architecture
for a Globalized World', address at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 8 May
1998). See, inter alia, JJ Norton, A 'New International Financial Architecture?': Reflections on
the Possible Law-Based Dimensions, comprising ch 7 (pp 135-82) in JB Attanasio and JJ
Norton, A New International Financial Architecture: A Viable Approach (London: BIICL,
2002).
8 Norton, ibid 180-2.
9 See, eg, Andrew Sheng, 'The New International Financial Architecture: Is There a
Workable Solution?', comprising ch 1 in Attanasio and Norton, above n 7.
10 See, inter alia, IMF, A Guide To Committees, Groups, And Clubs (Factsheet, 2006), at
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/factstgroups.htm (accessed 24 Sept 2006).
11 See, inter alia, GA Walker, International Banking Regulation Law Policy and Practice,
(Kluwer Law 2001), and Joseph J Norton, Devising International Bank Supervisory Standards
(Martinus Nijhoff 1995).
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private financial industry sectors. 12 As such, NIFA might be viewed as an
evolving policy construct, moving towards a new 'governance structure'
reflecting a 'public-private partnership' among governments, financial
sector authorities, international financial institutions and private interna-
tional financial institutions in the search for grounding a stable, but viable
global financial environment. However, the main focus of this
'public-private partnership' is, for the most part, on global financial stabil-
ity issues and on deepening financial markets but not on broadening such
markets in terms of greater financial inclusion or the serving of the
economic-social development needs of the majority of the population of
developing countries.
13
At its 1994 Naples Summit, the G-7 Heads of State made financial
sector reform issues a major agenda item for its 1995 Halifax Summit.
14
But, it was really not until the Birmingham (1998), Cologne (1999) and
Okinawa (2000) Summits that the NIFA begins to be fleshed-out.15 The
G7 Finance Minister Reports in Cologne (June 1999) and Okinawa (June
2000) specifically followed up, in some detail, on the following NIFA
components:
" Strengthened Macroeconomic Policy for Emerging Economies
" Strengthened and Reformed IFIs
" Accurate and Timely Informational Flows and Transparency
" Strong Financial Regulation in Industrial Countries
* Strong Financial Systems in Emerging Markets
" Exchange Rate Policies






12 Virtually all the involved international bodies directly or indirectly involved the financial
industries sectors (as they are direct subjects of such standards) in their devising, revising and
implementing international financial sector standards.
13 See, inter alia, Joseph J Norton, 'A Perceived Trend in Modem International Financial
Regulation: Increasing Relevance of the Public-Private Partnership', 37 Int'l Law 43
(Symposium 2003).
14 See htp//www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1994naples/communique/introduction.html
(accessed 12 Oct 2006).
,5 For a copy of the various Heads of State and Related Communiques from the various
Summits from 1975-2006, see generally http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/index.htm
(accessed, 12 Oct 2006).
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An integral dimension of all this would be a significant 'law-based dimen-








" Payment, Settlement and Custody Mechanisms
" Pension Funds and Collective Investment Schemes
" Accounting and Auditing Standards.
Though the G-7 singled out treatment of emerging economies as to finan-
cial sector reforms, when one reads through all this, the bottom line appears
to be that these economies needed to adopt and to implement the existing and
unfolding 'international standards and best practices,' with the IFIs playing a
major role (directly and/or indirectly) in the implementation, transmission
and related technical assistance processes. Otherwise, the focus of the G-8
Heads of State and Finance Ministers at Birmingham, Cologne and Okinawa
as to developing countries was mainly in the context of debt alleviation for
the poorest of the developing countries and on how to integrate the develop-
ing world into the 'global environment.' The underlying assumption appears
to be that sustained global growth, increased trade and investment liberaliza-
tion will bring increased economic growth for developing countries and a
strengthened international financial system will foster such global growth.
17
From 2000 to the present, the G-8 appears to have been absorbed by a
proliferating range of international political and security crises. As to finan-
cial sector reform, the use of Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs)
and greater IFI cooperation is encouraged and there is increased concern as
to financial crimes, corruption and fighting terrorism financing.' 8 Debt
relief for the poorest countries gained further and more detailed traction
with the 2005 Gleneagles Summit. 19
16 The FSF oversees these standards and codes and has compiled the series of key standards
and codes into a working Compendium. See FSF, Compendium of Standards at
htt.J/www.fsforum.org/compendium/about.html (accessed 19 Oct 2006).
1 See, eg, Report of G7 Finance Ministers to the K6iln Economic Summit Cologne,
Germany, 18-20 June, 1999 at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/financelfm06l999.htm (accessed
12 Oct 2006).
18 See, eg, 'Strengthening the International Financial Architecture', Report from G-10
Finance Ministers to the Heads of State and Government, Fukuoka, Japan, 8 July, 2000 at
http.//www.g7.utoronto.ca/financefm2OO00708-st.htm (accessed 19 Oct 2006).
1 On the Gleneagle's Summit, see http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2005gleneagles/
index.html (accessed 12 Oct 2006).
Taking in the 'Excluded' 199
In retrospect, the thrust of the G7/G8 financial sector reform mandates
over the past decade can be seen as geared to the following policy concerns:
* Financial crises avoidance and resolution
" Financial stability
* Financial services liberalization
" Regional and global cooperation.
More recently, the financial sector reform is also driven by industrialized-
country concern for financial sector integrity which notion has come to
embrace the following:
" Anti-money laundering (eg, drug dealing and other criminal activities)
" Combating terrorism financing ('September 11')
" Anti-corruption
* Corporate governance of financial institutions
" Transparency and Accountability
" Greater Availability of Information-Enhanced Disclosure.
2 0
While one can reasonably and in good faith, as does the World Bank and
the other IFI's, rationalize to itself and to the outside world that these focal
points are directly related to the economic development processes of devel-
oping countries, the truth is that these concerns have been engendered as a
result of direct industrialized-country interests and that in many of these
instances the interconnection with substantive development goals of
poverty reduction is indirect and in some instances quite tenuous at best.
2 1
All this being observed, the bottom line is that the role of the IFIs in the
financial sector reform area over the past decade has been mandated largely
by the G7/8 global policy determinations and 'directives.'
B. NIFA and the Role of International Standards: An Industrialized
Country Initiative
As alluded to above, the G7/G8 also directed a number of international
20 Consider, eg, World Bank, 'World Bank and AMLCFT' at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/
finance/htmllamlcftindex.htm (accessed 12 Oct 2006).
21 For example, having a 'Basel-compliant' banking systems is a good goal for all coun-
tries-developed and developing-but for a developing country it does not really get to the
core issue of how the banking and financial system should best be structured to serve optimum
country-specific economic-social development needs. Also, while of key concern to the United
States and other highly industrialized efforts in their so-called 'global war on terrorism', it is
quite dubious that the amount of efforts development banks now spend on the areas of anti-
money laundering and counterterrorism financing produces an real development benefits that
would justify the cost and effort.
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organizations to develop agreed international prudential standards (codes)
necessary to be implemented in order to encourage and to improve confi-
dence in and viability of domestic financial systems. The aim of such stan-
dards was to promote sound financial institutions, to minimize systemic
risk and to encourage savings and investment activity through increased
confidence in financial markets, both domestically and internationally. It
must be noted at the outset, however, that these international principles and
standards were to be just that: minimum internationally-agreed upon guide-
lines that leave latitude in their implementation.
22
The G-7 Finance Ministers were impressed with the work over prior
years by the Basel Committee and IOSCO on developing 'international
standards for prudential supervision' of banks, securities firms and markets
and payments and settlements systems. The Ministers particularly approved
joint Basel Committee/IOSCO work on 'market risk' and capital adequacy,
derivatives and futures exchanges-all sophisticated areas of concern for
the industrialized countries. The Ministers also recognized the cooperation
among the bank, securities and insurance supervisors through the Joint
Forum (JF) and recommended better vehicles for increased institutional
cooperation. With hindsight, one can see from this thread the subsequent
increased importance and spread of 'international standards and codes' and
the later formation of the international standards coordinator, the Financial
Stability Forum (FSF).
23
Quite clearly, the development of international banking standards by the
Basel Committee long ante-dates the emergence of the NIFA. In fact, the
Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of the 'Group of 10 ,2 4 in
1974 became concerned with possible development of international bank
supervisory standards as a result of the inter-related insolvency of two small
international banks (the German Bankhaus Herstatt and the American
Franklin National Bank) due to excessive exchange rate risks and the lack
,2 See Finance Ministers Report to the Heads of State and Government on International
Monetary Stability, Lyon G7 Summit, 28 June 1996 at http-J/www.g7.utoronto.ca/summitt
19961yon/finance.html (accessed 29 Sept 2006).
2 ibid.
24 The G-10 Group came about in 1974 as a consequence of the establishment in 1962 of
the General Agreement to Borrow (GAB) pursuant to decision of the Executive Board of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Group was informally established with the support
of the IMF, OECD, the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), by the finance ministers of
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and
United States for the primary purpose of intergovernmental consulting regarding implementa-
tion of calls upon the lines of credit extended to the IMF under the GAB--the scope of such
consultation being broadened over the years. Subsequently, Switzerland has become an active
member of the Group, rendering the 'G-10' designation a misnomer. The G-10 Group oper-
ates through the respective finance ministers on the highest level, but also on specific subject-
matters through various ad hoc committees. See generally Group of Ten homepage at
http://www.oecd.orgldocument/32/0,2340,en-2649-34115-36191264-1-1-1- ,00.html
(accessed 17 Oct 2006).
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of any coordinated supervision by the concerned regulatory authorities to
address this problem, and established in 1975 what is now the Basel
Committee.25 The Central Bank Governors were not, as to this incident,
concerned about any specific systemic crisis, but it dawned on them that in
the new 1970s era of global floating exchange rates that there were
increased international risks for banking institutions and that there was no
agreed mechanism for co-coordinating cross-border supervision of such
institutions.26 In addition, the Bank of England Governor was becoming
concerned that 'capital adequacy' of banking institutions was turning into
an issue of international import: traditionally, bank regulators/supervisors
were primarily concerned with institutional liquidity. As such, the first tasks
of the Basel Committee came to be consideration of cross-border supervi-
sion and capital adequacy. The objects of this focus were international
banks of the industrialized countries comprising the membership of the
Basel Committee.
27
During the 1980s, the Basel Committee did produce a revised framework
'Concordat' for attempting to allocate international bank supervisory
authority among the host and home regulator/supervisor: a rather sketchy
version had been quietly put together in 1975.28 This framework was to be
revised on several further occasions during the remainder of the 1980s and
the 1990s, largely as a reaction to specific bank failures that exposed the
framework as inadequate. 29 Also, during the mid-1990s it became appar-
ent that 'international banking institution' was an incomplete notion for
supervision of the large industrialized banks as they tended to operate more
and more within the structure of banking/financial 'conglomerates.' Thus,
a supervisory framework for dealing with these conglomerates also was
developed. 30 This in turn, led to consideration of the issue of the 'lead regu-
lator' as to such conglomerates.
31
25 Reference to the founding mandate for the Basel Committee from the Governors of the
Central Banks of the G-I0 countries can be found in a Press Communique of the G-10 Central
Bank Governors of 12 Feb 1975 issued through the BIS.
26 See Norton-above n 11, ch 4 section II A.
27 See discussion of role of Committee by WP Cooke, the Chair of the then Chair of the
Basel Committee, in 'Basle Supervisors Committee' (Committee document for external distri-
bution) (21 June 1984).
28 The first public appearance of the 1975 Concordat was as an Annex ('Supervision of
Banks' Foreign Establishments') to RC Williams and GG Johnson, 'International Capital
Markets: Recent Developments and Short-term Prospects' (1981), at 29-32 (IMF Occasional
Paper No 7, 1981).
9 See, inter alia, Douglas Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth and the Role of Law
Cambridge University Press 2007 forthcoming), ch 6.
30 See GA Walker, 'Financial Conglomerates: The Next Generation', 30 Int'l Law. 45
(1996).
31 See GA Walker, 'Conglomerate Law and International Financial Supervision', 17 Ann
Rev Banking L 287 (1998).
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The most significant efforts of the Committee during the 1980s to the
present have been on risk-based capital adequacy standards. After
extended, and at times contentious, internal deliberations a risk-based
'Capital Adequacy Accord' was promulgated by the Committee in 1988.32
While a non-binding, non-official document, this Accord soon (through a
complex, informal and uncoordinated transmission matrix) became the
international benchmark for bank capital adequacy within the developed
world and then developing world.33 Prior to this Accord, the capital
approach taken by most bank regulators/supervisors was a basic initial
capitalization requirement and then an on-going requirement of some form
of fixed capital-based ratio (eg, capital to assets). 34 At the time, the 1988
Accord was thought to be a most complex approach, while today it is
considered a basic, rudimentary framework, when compared to what the
Committee has proposed currently in the form of the Basel H Accord.
35
In a sense, the 1988 Capital Accord was an 'opening of Pandora's box'
as to the future formulation of international bank standards. Once a risk-
based approach became the guiding measure, it then became logical for the
Basel Committee to delve into a range of other risks, such as to exchange
rates, interest rates, other market-based risks, and operational risks. These
all resulted in a series of other detailed Committee pronouncements.
Moreover, beginning in the late 1980s and continuing on to today, the
Committee became concerned with money laundering 36 and, more recently,
related counter-terrorism regulatory standards. 37 Further, in the later part
of the 1990s, the Committee also began to address more formal issues of
institutional governance as to banking institutions.
38
Under the NIFA context, international standards and codes have
evolved, have increased as to subject-matter and continue to be
refined/revised on the basis of global and industrial country experiences and
expectations. In this sense, they represent the key model components for a
country's 'modern' financial system. They may be utilized for multi-
purposes: for example, unilaterally by a country in reforming its domestic
financial system, may comprise a part of IMF and Bank 'conditionality'
programmes, may be employed by an IFI in requested technical assistance
32 Basel Committee, Report on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards (July 1988).
33 See, inter alia, JJ Norton, 'Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory
Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities' (1989) Ohio St L J 1299.
34 See, eg, J Norton and SC Whitley, Banking Law Manual (1995), ch 3.
35 See Norton, Capital Adequacy, above n 33.
36 See, eg, Basel Committee, Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the
Purpose of Money Laundering (1988).3 See, eg, Initiatives by the BCBS, TAIS and IOSCO to combat money laundering and the
financing of terrorism-Update (2005)
38 See, eg, Basel Committee, Enhancing corporate governance for banking organizations
(1999), as replaced by a Feb 2006 revision.
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packages, may used by the IMF in its ROSC-macro-economic surveillance
efforts, and may be used by the Bank more flexibly in assessing domestic
country financial sector infrastructures for development purposes. But, for
whatever purpose used, on-the-ground reform work over the past decade
plus has shown repeatedly that the application of standards and codes is a
top-down model, that each country's situation is sui generis, and that these
standards and code have not been designed as developmental-access instru-
ments.
39
III. WORLD BANK'S NEW AGENDA ON FINANCIAL ACCESS AND EQUITY ISSUES
Inherently, the IFIs/RFIs represent an enormous repository of accumulated
knowledge concerning policies, theories, issues and practices concerning the
Developing World: they are in a real sense socio-economic and legal devel-
opment knowledge banks. As such, they should be in the best position to
help influence and guide the much needed connection between financial
sector development and meaningful economic development goals respecting
their client developing country members. This is often easier said than done
for a variety of overriding practical reasons. For example, these RFIIFIs
tend to be complex bureaucracies, as to whose limited human and financial
resources there is enormous internal and external competition. These insti-
tutional demands have expanded exponentially over the past several
decades covering not simply traditional macro-economic development
concerns but also a very broad range of micro-economic matters, macro
and micro-financial sector concerns, human capital development issues (the
encapsulating one of which is poverty alleviation), societal dilemmas such
as gender issues, global human migration and fundamental human rights
concerns. As can been seen, financial sector issues is only one of so many
pressing demands upon IFI/RFI resources.
Moreover, coherent and forward-looking institutional priority-setting by
the IFIIRFIs is most difficult, time-consuming and often contentious.
Further, these various institutions may have differing mandates and
approaches to their mandates. Historical collaboration among these insti-
tutions has been marginal at best. In addition, as discussed above, the
IFI/RFI focus on financial sector reform generally and on the legal-institu-
tional aspect thereof particularly is a relatively recent 'add-on' dimension of
these institutions mandated by the G7/G8 and arising in large part as a reac-
tion to financial crises, the need for global financial stability and concerns
over money-laundering and terrorist financing abuses of financial systems.
In addressing these financial sector demands, the IFIs/RFIs have largely
39 See, inter alia, Norton, Emerging Markets, above n 7.
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looked to industrialized-country standards and standard-setting and have
engaged in large measure staff and consultants drawn from the industrial-
ized world (people having significant financial sector experience in their
developed country environment but little, if any, development background
and experience).
A bright light in this quagmire is that most recently the IFIs/RFIs, in
particular the World Bank, are beginning to focus in a more comprehensive
way on the 'missing component' to viable banking/financial sector legal
reform in developing countries: the inclusion of the mass of the excluded
developing world population. Through this focus reorientation, it may be
possible for these institutions to better set and develop their own internal
priorities in this area of reform and then to be of greater assistance to their
developing country members in assisting them effectively to develop and to
coordinate meaningful policies, institutions and legal infrastructure respect-
ing more relevant, accessible and equitable financial sectors.
In this context, it is of significance that the World Bank dedicated its
entire World Development Report 2006 to the theme of 'Equity and
Development', 40 This Report, the work-product of the Bank's staff, consid-
ers equity in terms of 'two basic principles': equal opportunity and avoid-
ance of deprivation of income. The Report 'highlights that legal and
regulatory frameworks and equitable justice systems can do much to level
the playing field in the political, economic and socio-cultural domains, but
they can also reinforce existing inequalities'. In addition, in anticipation of
this Report the Bank's Legal Vice Presidency (LVP), then under Hon
Roberto Dafiino, perceptively held an extended high-level, forerunner
conference in December 2005 on 'Law, Equity and Development'. The
primary purpose of this event was to explore ways the LVP and the Bank
should best be approaching matters of legal and justice reform, including
how to move the LVP forward to the next generation of financial sector
legal reform.4 1 This event was followed up and expanded upon by another
major World Bank Conference in Spring 2006 on a wide range of issues
concerning 'access and equality' in economic and financial development.
42
For present and illustrative purposes, this Part III highlights two other
significant developments at the World Bank with respect to financial sector
access issues. First, the Bank recently has commissioned a series of reports
concerning access to financial services in Latin America; hopefully these
and other country reports from the Bank will provide a good comparative
40 This Report, a late 2005 co-publication of the Bank and Oxford University Press.
41 This conference was held on 1-2 Dec 2005 at the IFC in Washington, DC.
42 See World Bank (Financial Sector), Global Conference on Access to Finance: Building
Inclusive Financial Systems (Washington, DC, 30-1 May 2006), at http-/web.worldbank.orgf
WBSITEIEXTERNAJWBIWBIPROGRAMSIFSLP/0,,contentMDK:20611560-pagePK:6415
6158-piPK:64152884-theSiePK:461005,00.html (accessed 24 Sept 2006).
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data and policy base for the Bank and its LVP to begin to formulate a 'next
generation' approach to bank/financial sector legal reform respecting devel-
oping countries. The second Bank development is the expanded actual and
potential role the Bank, with the IMF, is beginning to make of its FSAPs and
related country Financial Sector Assessments (FSAs) for purposes of foster-
ing financial sector access and equity.
A. The Country Studies
The thematic strand that unifies the four World Bank studies discussed
below, which previous studies have glossed over, is that the definition of
financial access must be broadened. The definition is now seen not only to
include the ability for small businesses or individuals to obtain loans, but to
include holding a checking or savings account, debit or credit cards, being
able to pay for services at a branch or ATM instead of only at a downtown
office, and having access to investment opportunities. These studies all
examine the methods of savings and how cultural, environmental, and
socio-economic factors come into play in creating poverty. Government
policies, such as excessive reserve requirements, play a large role in rein-
forcing cycles of poverty. Further, these studies also find that access to tech-
nology can play a large role in alleviating those cycles of poverty by
allowing easier access to services to the poor. These four studies are the
following:
(1) Poverty Reduction and Growth: Vicious to Virtuous Circles,4 3
which examines the essential question of how cycles of poverty rein-
force themselves and what policies can be put into place to break
those cycles;
(2) Access to Financial Services in Brazil,44 which examines specific
issues in Brazil and highlights their implications to government
policy;
(3) Access to Financial Services in Colombia: the 'Unbanked' in Bogota,45
which examines the issues of the 'unbanked' in Bogota; and
(4) Urban Unbanked in Mexico and the United States,4 6 which
compares the differences between access to financial services for the
poor in both countries.
43 Guillermo Perry, Poverty Reduction and Growth: Vicious to Virtuous Circles (World
Bank 2005) ('Circles').
44 Anjali Kumar Access to Financial Services in Brazil (World Bank 2005) ('Brazil').
45 Tova Solo, Access to Financial Services in Colombia: the 'Unbanked' in Bogota (World
Bank 2006) ('Columbia').
46 John Caskey, The Urban Unbanked in Mexico and the United States (World Bank 2006)
(Mexico-US).
Joseph J Norton
1. Vicious to Virtuous Circles
Written in 2005, this study explores in depth the search for pro-poor
growth. It is well known that increases in growth can increase income to the
poor and alleviate poverty.
The reverse thesis has not been sufficiently explored, and provides the
thesis for this study: that poverty may be part of the reason for a region's
poor growth performance, creating vicious circles where low growth results
in high poverty and high poverty in turn results in low growth. The more
novel thesis of the report is that Latin America's persistent poverty may
itself be impeding the achievement of higher growth rates, which implies
that there are reinforcing vicious circles that keep the poor in poverty and
unable to contribute to national growth.
In light of the study's findings, the question about whether financial poli-
cies should emphasize pro-growth or pro-poor can be answered simply,
'Yes.' Strategies that do not focus on growth ignore the greatest means
governments and institutions have at their disposal for improving human
well-being. At the same time, these same institutions and governments must
take account of the constraints facing the impoverished so that they can
fully participate in any growth, and thereby also contribute back to the
wave of growth. This study describes the process of redressing these
constraints brings to light under-examined dimension of policy analysis that
might be called pro-growth poverty reduction.
This study shows that in order to achieve the greatest reduction in
poverty, the relative emphasis on growth versus redistribution should vary
depending on the individual country's initial conditions. Poor countries
such as Bolivia, Haiti, and Honduras and relatively equal countries that,
bluntly put, have little to distribute, need first and foremost high and
sustained growth, even at the expense of some increases in inequality. The
paper compares this kind of growth to the growth recently experienced in
China. In contrast, relatively richer and more unequal countries most of
Latin America, and especially Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico-
need both higher growth and significant redistribution in order to begin the
process of the reduction of poverty.
The poverty traps described in chapter six of this Brazil study, apply to
both national and regional areas equally. Regional traps must take into
account that within countries, labor does not move freely. This creates large
wage gaps of up to 50 per cent from region to region.
4 7
Bringing the historical discussion above into the present, this study
shows that roughly half of the stark difference in income inequality between
Latin America and contemporary Organization for Economic Co-operation
47 Circles, above n 43, at 122.
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and Development (OECD) countries results from differences in returns to
factors of production-the result of the unequal distribution of human and
other capital in Latin America. But the other half results from the generally
non-progressive nature of Latin America's system of transfers. More impor-
tant, although Latin American public expenditures underwrite large,
progressive items (basic education and health), they also fund large regres-
sive items (subsidies to pensions, tertiary education, and energy), which
offset the progressive spending. The study's conclusion is that a country's
financial history is not its destiny. The decline in Latin America's income
position in the last 50 years while the OECD member nations demonstrated
the ability to sharply reduce inequality during the same period demon-
strates that choices of policies and institutions can lead to major improve-
ments along both dimensions. This study finds that policies such as
increased access to education and infrastructure have had direct positive
impacts on growth, inequality, and poverty reduction. Other policies, such
as trade opening, have had positive effects on growth but have tended to
increase inequality and even poverty in the short run. These short-term
issues can be mitigated by better policy considerations, so that in the long
run these pro-growth policies will lead to more financial equality.
2. Access to Financial Services in Brazil
The objective of the present study is to identify ways of expanding access
that acknowledge the risks and costs involved but provide measures to miti-
gate their impact. Brazil's financial system is by far the largest in Latin
America. Beyond its sheer size, the overall depth of financial intermediation
in Brazil, at almost 140 per cent of gross domestic product, is greater than
that of its large neighbours in the region such as Mexico or Argentina,
despite their higher average per capita income. Despite the size of Brazil,
concern about financial exclusion increased over the last decade, with the
number of banks in decline since the late 1990s. Only some 60 million, or
approximately one-third, of Brazil's population has a bank account.
Brazil's policies which attempt to provide credit to the poor have a high
cost. The high costs of these programmes have another unintended result:
the government's large borrowing needs have a negative impact on private
credit. Large reserve requirements add to implicit taxation. Some more
conservative estimates suggest that concessions and support could amount
to several billion Reals. Unfortunately, Brazil's policies themselves also may
be ineffective at reaching the poorest and most in need of financial access.
As an example of the costs and failure of Brazil's policies is the National
Program to Strengthen Family Agriculture (PRONAF) which is estimated to
cost R$1.1 billion. The largest 2 per cent of borrowers receive 57 per cent
of loans in agriculture, whereas the smallest 75 per cent of borrowers
receive only 6 per cent of credit. 4 8 As illustrated by the analysis of rural
finance programmes, many such programmes fail to reach their intended
targets, instead being captured by a few, to the detriment of broad-based
access.
There is a role for more proactive government policies toward access to
financial services; however, the success of these policies will be the greatest
if they are backed by fundamental changes in overall approach to access.
This approach must be delivered through broad-based financial sector
reforms that limit constraints on the price and quantity of credit. Finally,
these policies must reduce the role given to the relatively small number of
public institutions charged with their delivery in order to ensure fair access.
3. Access to Financial Services in Colombia: The 'Unbanked' in Bogota
Supported by the Colombian Bank Association, this study finds that access
to financial services is a determinant in a country's development, which
access to financial services translates into progress. The study quotes Ross
Levine's statement that 'No shortage of evidence exists to suggest that the
level of financial development is a good indicator of economic growth, capi-
tal accumulation and of the technological change of the future economy.'
49
The study takes a specific look at the financial situation in Bogota, looking
at what life is like outside the formal financial system, for one family who
moved to Bogota in the 1950s, attempted to build their home through 'self-
help' ended up paying twice the cost of their home.
The study is harshly critical of the continuation of the government's tax on
financial transactions, originally intended to be a temporary solution to the
banking crisis in Columbia. The tax has now been made a permanent one,
and has been increased from 0.2 per cent to 0.4 per cent. Financial exclusion
in the country has created significant welfare losses, has created a declining
savings rate, and has created a financial system that caters to the wealthy
through monthly fees that equal 5-10 per cent of the minimum wage.
The study states the thesis that an effective financial sector reduces the
cost of information sharing between economic agents and that the current
trend does not look positive for the country. Though the 'unbanked' are
often paid by check, they have no access to financial institutions, and are
forced to pay large check cashing fees and to do business in remote central
bank locations. Further, to obtain credit, every individual or small business
must approach potential lenders one by one to obtain the amount and terms
that they require.
48 Brazil, above n 44, at 280.
49 Columbira, above n 45, citing Levine, Ross Financial Development and Economic
Growth: Views and Agenda Journal of Economic Literature Volume XXXV, June 1997.
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The costs that these factors represent constitute an inhibiting factor for
growth in general. This has created an alternative system whereby many
individuals save and borrow primarily through friends and family, and their
primary savings is tied to home ownership. This alternative method cuts off
their financial resources from the nation or region which stagnates growth.
4. The Urban Unbanked in Mexico and the United States
This study examines how impoverished households in the United States and
Mexico obtain basic financial services. This study examines the efforts that
the private sector and government have taken in order to provide access to
those services, both in terms of cost and quality. The differences between
the ways in which the unbanked in the United States and Mexico provide
an instructive contrast, which provides commentary on how policies can be
effective and how policies must differ, based on different cultures of saving
and investing.
A further argument to link broader coverage of financial services to
economic growth comes from the private sector. The savings and loan crisis
experienced in the United States in the 1980s did not in fact cause a major
sector collapse: this has been attributed to the fact that the US banks had
spread their businesses over a wider gamut, depending on a variety of popu-
lation sectors, not just the wealthy. This can be contrasted with the similar
situations experienced in Mexico and in Colombia that did cause major
financial crises. Experience also shows that financial institutions catering to
low-income clients can be good businesses. Recent studies by the US Federal
Reserve have favourably compared the profitability of investments under
the Community Reinvestment Act credits to commercial investments. These
studies have also shown the profitability of community development financ-
ing institutions is favourable to other start-up banks.
The differences between the unbanked in Mexico and the United States
are striking. One study showed that while in the United States where there
are multiple alternatives; cheque-cashing services can often charge a fee of
2-3 per cent.50 In Mexico, where there are few practical alternatives, there
are no fees for cheque-cashing services.5 1 This shows that significant differ-
ences exist and any approach to solving issues must take into account those
differences: there is no one-size-fits-all solution.
It should come as no surprise that the challenges the impoverished face
in obtaining financial assistance is at best difficult and at worst impossible.
The collective observations of these four studies reaffirms that although the
poor face challenges, there is much work that can be done to alleviate the
severity of these cycles of poverty. There are very common policies that can
50 Mexico-US, at 16. 51 ibid at 41.
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be implemented across Latin America which would go a long way to
improving the situation that the unbanked in those countries face.
B. FSAPs: One Possible Supporting Pillar for the 'Next Generation'
of Financial Sector Legal reforn.
Coming out of the 1998 Birmingham and 1999 Cologne G-8 Summits were
mandates for the IHs concerning both the internal evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of their IH reform programmes/projects and more broadly to
develop assessment mechanisms concerning the condition of the financial
sector as a whole and recommendations for reform. The policy thought is
that identification of financial system strengths and vulnerabilities will help
promote financial stability and to reduce the potential for crisis. These
mandates have led to the enhancement of IMF surveillance mechanisms, to
the establishment of independent internal offices, and to the establishment
of a joint IMF-Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), begin-
ning with a joint pilot programme in 1999. Based on the initial success of
the pilot programme, the joint FSAP programme was refined and formal-
ized on an ongoing basis, with this initiative being coordinated through a
IMF-Bank Financial Sector Liaison Committee (FSLC).5 2
As conceived,
5 3
the FSAP. . . is widely recognised by participating countries and by the
international community as an important instrument for diagnosis of
potential vulnerabilities and analysis of development priorities in the
financial sectors of member countries .... One objective of the FSAP is
to help countries map a transition to a more diversified and competitive
financial sector without creating vulnerabilities. A well-functioning
financial services sector is essential for sustained economic development
and poverty reduction. The existence of a wide and diversified set of
sound, well-managed institutions and markets also reduces the likeli-
hood and magnitude of a financial crisis. [emphasis added]
Thus, from its inauguration, in order to accommodate the differing insti-
tutional missions of the IMF and the Bank, the FSAP initiative has been
articulated in terms of bifurcated objectives: (i) financial crisis prevention
and financial stability and (ii) economic development and poverty reduc-
tion. This author suggests that these objectives are not necessarily co-exten-
sive or fully compatible. Further this author would note that in terms of the
52 IMF & World Bank, Financial Sector Assessment Programme-Review, Lessons, and
Issues Going Forward (24 Feb 2003), 5.
53 ibid at 4.
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Bank's mandate, these objectives gloss over what a 'well-functioning finan-
cial services sector' should mean in terms of economic development and
poverty reduction. Moreover, the causal linkage between the 'modern'
financial sector model envisioned by the FSAP criteria and instruments and
actual 'poverty reduction' has never been empirically substantiated. This
being said the Bank's stated FSAP objective possible might be able to
provide the context within which to determine how best the FSAP process
can be utilized as a catalytic and supportive vehicle for the 'next generation'
of financial sector reform.
Functionally, an FSAP is requested voluntarily by a country and is
normally effected over several joint IMF-Bank team missions.54 Upon
completion, the team prepares an aide-memoire presenting the findings.
55
This non-published, confidential document will be used by the IMF to
prepare a Financial Sector Stability Assessment (FSSA) for presentation to
its Executive Board, and is often used also in connection with the Fund's
surveillance role under its biennial 'Article IV consultations'. The Bank staff
will use the aide-memoir to put together a Financial Sector Assessment
(FSA) for its Executive Board.
The FSAP itself entails three main components: (i) systematic analysis of
financial soundness indicators (FSIs) and stress tests; (ii) assessments of
standards and codes; and (iii) assessment of the broader financial stability
framework, including systemic liquidity arrangements, governance and
transparency, and financial safety nets and insolvency regimes. The FSAP
work has come to support the IMF's role in the standards and code area and
to support the Bank's development efforts (particularly as to technical assis-
tance), including as to its Country Assistance Strategies (CAS).
The FSAP is separate from but substantively linked to the IMF's role as
to Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (the ROSC initiative).
According to the Bank, there are three reasons for its participation in the
ROSC initiative:
5 6
(1) the structural and institutional underpinnings of a market economy
are an important complement to sound macroeconomic policies for
both successful integration with the world economy and for sound
development;
(2) implementation of standards can assist countries establish these
foundations, in turn contributing to domestic and international
financial stability; and
51 IMF & World Bank FSAP, above n 52, p 25.
55 These are not published. Prior to March 2003, FSAP teams prepared more lengthy FSAP
reports.
IMF & World Bank, Assessing the Implementation of Standards: A Review of Experience
and Next Steps (11 Jan 2001), 26.
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(3) partnership with the IMF provides the basis for a comprehensive
approach and broad-based effort for the implementation of stan-
dards.
However, the FSAP, at least for the Bank, selectively and more flexibly
utilizes particular codes and standards (in consultation with the host coun-
try), may deal with standards not formally under the ROSC (eg creditors
rights and corporate insolvency, deposit insurance and bank insolvency),
and will deal with cross-sectoral issues. In recent years, the Bank has been
attempting to integrate the FSAP, FSA and ROSC processes into its evolv-
ing development agenda. Notably, this integration effort has begun to
address the developmental context of the overall financial legal infrastruc-
tures and issues of access.
The FSAP process for the Bank has its limitations in addressing the devel-
opmental context and content of the 'next generation' of financial sector
legal reform. The process is a joint institution effort, has divergent overall
objectives, is conducted by a joint institution team, and is a complex tech-
nical process. However, the FSAP is also a flexible data-gathering process
that most probably can be better and more broadly utilized by the Bank and
its LVP in evaluating, revising and prioritizing its financial sector reform
policy objectives and related technical assistance. Certainly, this is well
worth serious consideration by the Bank and its LVP and the IME
IV. TWO CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE: MICROFINANCING AND
PRIVATE INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION
In selectively looking at recent developments in the financial access area as
to developing countries, two potential institutional developments are worth
noting for present purposes: (i) the rise of microfinancing and (ii) private
banking industry initiatives in South Africa.
A. Microfinancing
With the recent Nobel Peace Prize award to Muhammad Yunus of the
Grameen Bank in India for his and his bank's work with developing micro-
finance products for the poor and expanding the use of such product on a
commercially viable basis,57 it seems microfinance is a new discovery. The
reality, however, is that microfinancing has been around at least since the
1950s, having a very spotty record of success until more recent times.5 8 The
57 See generally nobelprize.org/nobeLprizespeacelaureates/2006 (accessed 20 Dec 2006).
58 See CGAP's extensive website on microfinancing at http://cgap.org/portal/site/cgap
(accessed 24 Sept 2006).
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recently formed consortium of donor countries affiliated with the World
Bank, the Consultative Group for Assisting the Poorest (CGAP) has
brought microfinancing into the mainstream of the IFI development
agenda.
1. Background
Microfinance, along with credit and national savings structures for small
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), has come to be viewed as of major
importance for enhancing the social and economic impact of the financial
sector of developing countries.5 9 Microfinance today is seen as a vital tool
against poverty since it directly provides to low-income people the tools to
build assets, increase and protect their source of income, and reach self-
sufficiency. For example, in Latin America (which will be the geographic
focus of this Subpart IV. A), microfinance institutions (MFIs) started to be
established in the 1980s with the arrival of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) making loans to poor 'microentrepreneurs'. In 1992, the Bolivian
NGO, PRODERM, converted into the first regulated MFIs in Latin
America: BancoSol, a regulated commercial bank.
Today, it is probably safe to argue that Latin America has the longest
tradition of commercially viable microfinance. In fact, competition tends to
be intense in some countries, especially in urban areas, and interest rates in
some countries have declined dramatically as a result of that competition.
For instance, in Bolivia market pioneer BancoSol charged a combination of
interest and fees equivalent to a 65 per cent annual percentage rate when it
began operating as a bank in 1992. Today, Banco Sol operates in a highly
competitive environment and has brought its interest rate down to 22 per
cent. In addition, leading institutions are increasingly offering a variety of
additional financial services to their clients, including savings vehicles and
management of international and domestic funds transfers.
60
2. Improvement of Microfinance.
Despite some degree of market penetration to date and a variety of finan-
cial services offered in some Latin American countries, there remains signif-
icant opportunities in larger Latin American countries where little
microfinancing currently is occurring (eg Mexico and Brazil), in secondary
cities, and in rural areas. 61 Despite media hype, only a small percentage of
s9 See generally The United Nations Economic and Social Council: International Year of
Microcredit, ESC Res1998/28, UN ESCOR, 45th mtg, UNDoc A/RES/53/197.
60 See Brigit Helms, Access for All, Building Inclusive Financial Systems, Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor (2006), at 9.
61 ibid.
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SMEs currently have access to formal financial services in Latin America.
62
Even in Chile, which has one of the most developed financial markets of the
continent, only large and well-established firms have access to the range of
financial instruments available.
63
The large number of excluded people in Latin America will gain access
only if financial services for the low-income people are integrated into all
three levels of the financial system: micro (financial service providers), meso
(support services and infrastructure) and macro (legislation, regulation, and
supervision). 64 Therefore, it will be necessary to coordinate public and
private reforms in order to enhance the equality and access of financial
systems.
First, it is important to understand client demand and to translate this
into high-quality, affordable, and convenient financial services offered by a
range of providers. 65 Today, microfinance is about building sound domes-
tic financial intermediaries that can provide services to low-income clients
on a permanent basis. Sustainability ensures that low-income clients have
permanent access to services.6 6 Second, to ensure sustainability, it is neces-
sary to have a strong financial infrastructure (the meso level), which
includes a complex and varied set of systems and instruments consisting of
systems that allow for electronic payments and service providers such as
auditors, raters, consulting services, information and point-of-sale technol-
ogy vendors, specialized technical support, and professional associations. 67
Accurate, standardized, and comparable information on financial perfor-
mance is imperative for integrating microfinance into the financial
system.
6 8
Finally, the government (the macro level) needs to offer a policy envi-
ronment that allows competitive and diverse financial service providers to
flourish. The key actions for governments are to maintain macro-economic
stability, to avoid interest rate caps, and to refrain from distorting the
market with unsustainable, subsidized, high-delinquency loan programmes.
Governments can also adjust banking sector regulation and supervision to
facilitate microfinancing while also protecting low-income people's
deposits. Governments can further support financial services by improving
the legal framework for contract enforcement and collateral rights, ensur-
ing practically and legally feasible systems of land titling, and ensuring that
62 See Alvaro Ramirez, The Microfinance Experience in Latin America and the Caribbean,
Inter-American Development Bank (2004). Available at http://www.ruralfinance.org/servlet
BinaryDownloaderServlet?filename=l 126101177627_Microfinanceexperience-in_LAC.pdf
(last visited 18 Nov 2006).
63 See Sophie Sirtaine, Access to Finance by Chilean Corporations, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 3845 (2006), at 3.
64 See Brigit Helms, above n 60, at 13. 65 ibid at 140.
66 ibid at 55. 67 ibid at 140.
68 ibid at 73.
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tax systems do not discriminate against different types of institutions
engaged in microfinance.
69
3. The Regulatory Reform
The pressure for regulatory reform has been building on several fronts in
Latin America since 1995. Such pressure has led some countries in the
region to create new types of financial institutions, precisely for the purpose
of enabling non-profit foundations to transform into financial intermedi-
aries.
70
In Bolivia, for example, a special law governing private financial funds
(FFPs) permits NGOs to transform into specialized regulated financial insti-
tutions allowed to mobilize deposits and intermediate government funds.
The minimum capital required is only around $1 million compared with
about $3 million for banks (as of April 2005). FFPs are subject to the same
(if not stricter) prudential supervision as banks and are monitored by the
same Banking Superintendency. The Superintendency requires all deposit-
taking institutions (including FFPs) to submit their financial statements on
a daily basis, an administrative burden that may discourage FFPs from
entering into more remote rural areas with weak telecommunications infra-
structure.71
There are two situations in which it may be appropriate to create a new
type of institution to facilitate the transformation of non-profit microcredit
foundations into licensed and supervised financial intermediaries:
(1) If the minimum capital requirement for existing institutional forms
is very high it could prevent mature and well-managed foundations
from entering the formal financial system; and
(2) If the existing institutional form has the lower minimum capital
requirement is severely limited in the type of operations it can carry
out-particularly in the area of savings mobilization-then it may
simply be unattractive form of institution for those microcredit foun-
dations that want to enter the formal financial system.
72
In some Latin America countries, the bad, predatory reputation of finance
companies has sometimes been mentioned as a reason to create a new
69 ibid at 92.
70 See Tor Jansson, Microfinance Regulation Sweeping Latin America, Microenterprise
Development Review, Inter-American Development Bank, vol 5 No 1 (2002), at 4. Available
at http'J/www.esglobal.compdf/PrivateCapitalforMicrofinanceHowtoTurn.pdf (last visited 18
Nov 2006).
71 See Brigit Helms, above n 60, at 88.
72 See Tor Jansson, above n 70, at 6.
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institutional form for non-profit foundations that want to transform into
formal financial intermediaries.
73
Creating new institutions for microfinance, even when well-justified and
structured, is not enough to provide a regulatory framework for microfi-
nance. The first and perhaps most important step to this end is to design
appropriate regulations for microlending as such, in which the regulation
should be guided by three principles: (a) flexibility, (b) simplicity, and (c)
automaticity-flexibility in interest rates, collateral and internal credit
processes; simplicity in client documentation, loan delinquency and recu-
peration of collateral; and automaticity in portfolio classification, loan loss
provisions and write-offs. In conjunction, such basic rules provide room for
innovation; lower the regulatory costs of compliance and subject
microlending to a strict recognition of revenues, expenses and risks.
74
Finally, although the regulatory framework is relevant, it constitutes
solely part of the story. The remaining part is supervision. Since most of the
regulatory initiatives are still quite recent (apart from Bolivia and Peru),
supervisory authorities have not yet developed effective processes, tools and
practices of supervision. 75 Ineffective supervision may be worse than none
at all, since the low-income clients could be led into a false sense of secu-
rity.76 Achieving the proper mix of regulations and supervisory practices
that foster a competitive and sound microfinance is the key, and it will
require a sustained commitment on the part of supervisory authorities.
77
Developing countries that are pursuing reforms to improve microfinance
need to analyse all levels of the financial system and not cause distortion in
other areas or destabilize the financial system as a whole. Importantly, the
private sector should be brought to the table to participate in the microfi-
nance process, seeing such participation as a commercial opportunity and
not as a money-loser or subsidized competition. The government, in turn,
should foster competition and facilitate chartering of financial institutions
specialized in lower income.
B. An Example of Non-Regulatory Public-Private Initiative:
The Case of South Africa
South Africa, as all developing countries, faces the general challenge of
providing basic financial services to the poor. Specifically, the country is
searching for ways to reduce the entrenched inequality of incomes,
economic opportunities, and access to services left over from years of
apartheid. Ironically, apartheid did leave South Africa with a developed
73 ibid at 6. 74 ibid at 8. 75 ibid at 8.
76 See Brigit Helms, above n 60, at 87.
'7 See Tor Jansson, above n 70, at 8.
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banking system that served the dominating white population. The 'trick' is
how to bring this banking sector into the developmental agenda of the
country. With over half of the South African population living on a $2 or
less day, it is imperative that the major financial institutions help redress the
historically weak system of services for lower income people.
Facing impending regulation (ie, a community reinvestment-type of
legislation similar to that in the United States), the South African financial
sector recently has responded to this demand for the expansion of access to
financial services to a broader segment of the population in the form of the
Financial Sector Charter ('the Charter'), a negotiated document adopted by
the financial sector in October 2003 and brought into effect on 1 January
2004. The Charter represents an important private sector response to the
broader challenges of transformation within, and transformation initiatives
by the financial sector.
1. Background
As mentioned above, South Africa has a well-developed and highly sophis-
ticated formal banking system.78 At the end of 2004, there were 38 regis-
tered banks in South Africa. 79 For historical reasons, a large proportion of
the South African population has not been adequately served by the formal
banking system. 80 The poorest sectors of the population and rural areas
mostly, have fallen outside of the net of the services provided by the formal
banking system. 81 Prior to the adoption of the Charter, the major banks
were pressurized to extend financial services, including credit for low-
income housing to the poorest sectors of the South African population and
to desist from discriminatory lending practices. However, the Government's
response to the challenge of expanding access to financial services and
access to housing finance for low income households has, from an early
stage, been characterized by the search for constructive partnerships
between the private sector and the public sector: a partnership where on
one hand the State would take measures to encourage the resumption of
payments for goods and services, and reinstate the rule of law, whereas on
the other hand the private sector would support the Government in its
78 G. Marcus, An Approach to the Consideration of Bank Merger Issues by Regulators: A
South African Case, BIS paper No 4-The Banking Industry in the Emerging Market
Economies: Competition, Consolidation and Systemic Stability (2001) available at
http//www.bis.org/publ/bispap04o.pdf (accessed 15 Nov 2006).
, Tito Mboweni, The South African Banking Sector-An Overview of the Past Ten Years:
Address by Mr Tito Mboweni, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at the Year End
Media Cocktail Function, 14 Dec 2004, available at www.bis.org/review/r041231f.pdf.
(accessed 15 Nov 2006)
80 Black Economic Empowerment Commission Report, at 19 (2001).
81 ibid. See also above n 78.
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efforts to bring about financial stability. In pursuing the goal of partnership
with the private sector, it would seem as though there has been an almost
studious avoidance of prescription to the private sector while at the same
time maintaining subtle and overt pressure on the private sector lending
institutions to participate more meaningfully in the transformation process.
The two major legislative acts, ie Home Loan and Mortgage Disclosure
Act 82 and the draft Community Reinvestment Bill, 2002,83 were developed
by the Government but never actually got implemented. This further tends
to reinforce the notion that the Government preferred to operate within a
collaborative as opposed to a prescriptive framework with the financial
sector.
2. Responding to the Challenge: The Financial Sector Charter
The Charter identifies a number of challenges facing the domestic finan-
cial sector, major among those being the Sector's 'inadequate' response to
increasing demand for access to financial services. The expansion of
access to financial services is seen as 'fundamental to BEE and to the
development of the economy as a whole.' The broad Charter commitment
assumed in paragraph 8 of the Charter is to 'increase effective access to
first order retail financial services to a greater segment of the population
within LSM 1-5'.84
It is important to understand the two key concepts 'effective access'
and 'first order financial resources' used in the Charter commitment. The
concept of 'effective access' as utilized in the Charter has five dimensions:
(1) service infrastructure and appropriate human resources must be
located within a distance of at least 20 km from potential users; the
range of products must be sufficiently diverse; non-discrimination;
(2) the products offered must be appropriate and affordably priced; and
the products must be structured and described in an way that is
easily accessible;
85
(3) first-order retail financial services as defined in the Charter include:
'transaction products and services, which serve the function of day-
to-day purposes;'
82 Act 63 of 2000; it should be noted that the act has not come into operation yet.
83 GN 23423 Government Gazette, 17 May 2005.
84 The Financial Sector Charter, 1 Jan 2004, S Af, at 1 8.3; LSM 1-5 refers to the Living
Standards Measure designed by the South African Advertising Research Foundation. Included
in LSM 1-5 are persons whose average household income ranges between R879 & R2472
(from SAARF AMPS 2004); see http-/www.saarf.co.za. (accessed 15 Nov 2006).
85 See above n 84, at 1 2.22.
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(4) savings products and services, which serve the function of providing
'a basic and secure means of accumulating funds over time'; credit
for low-income housing;8 6 and
(5) insurance products and services, which provide a cushion against
defined first order basic risks.
8 7
These provisions, and indeed the Charter as a whole, effectively depict the
process of forming a constructive partnership between the Government and
the private sector to meet the challenges of transformation.
Additionally, the broad Charter commitment referred to above is made
more concrete by a set of specific undertakings which can broadly be
divided into two categories: those whose implementation is sector centric in
that the responsibility for their implementation rests solely with the Sector
(sector centric undertakings) and those whose implementation depends on
negotiated arrangements reached with the Government and other actors
(collaborative undertaking). Furthermore, the Charter parties undertake to
establish, in collaboration with the Government, a monitoring and review
mechanism 'for the ongoing evaluation and review of the financial sector's
initiatives on access'. This strengthens the notion of a partnership between
the sector and the Government.
3. Implementation Mechanisms
In terms of the Charter, an independent body, the Charter Council with a
broad mandate to oversee the implementation of the Charter is to be estab-
lished. 88 The Charter Council is required to undertake periodic reviews of
the implementation of Charter and it is empowered to make decisions
regarding the implementation of the Charter in its second term
(2009-14).89 The Charter Council is to be comprised of industry associa-
tion representatives 9° and 'all others'. Government representatives and
86 It should be noted that low income housing in the context of first order financial services
is aimed at households with a stable income of at least R500 per month but below R7500 per
month.
87 See above n 84, at 2.27, the examples of the first order risks mentioned are death and
associated funeral costs; household insurance and health insurance.
88 ibid at 1 15.1.1.
89 See 15.1.1 read with 1 4.3.
90 The industry associations that were involved in the formulation and adoption of the
Charter were the Association of Black Securities and Investment Professionals (mandated by
the Black Business Council), Banking Council of South Africa, Association of Collective
Investments, Bond Exchange of South Africa, Foreign Bankers Association of South Africa,
Institution of Retirement Funds, Life Offices' Association of South Africa, South African
Insurers Association, Investment Managers Association of South Africa, JSE Securities
Exchange South Africa, South African Reinsurance Offices' Association, South African
Insurers Association.
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other interest groups are among the 'other' interest groups to be represented
on the Charter Council. The Charter Council is specifically required to
'fairly reflect the interests of all the financial institutions'. 91 This suggests
that there was a concern that the independent body might undermine such
interests.
The decision-making mechanism in the Charter Council is consensus.
This may be a mechanism for ensuring that the interests of financial insti-
tutions are not undermined in the Charter Council. It seems, however, that
consensus is the primary but not the exclusive mode of decision making
within the Charter Council. An absolute consensus requirement would
imply the possibility of institutional paralysis in circumstances where
Charter Council fails to reach consensus, especially on matters of impor-
tance. It is contemplated that a dispute-breaking mechanism will be agreed
within the Charter Council. 92 The possibility of arbitration or mediation
also exists as an alternative to an internally agreed dispute-breaking mech-
anism.93 This suggests that it might be possible to have definitive outcomes
on contentious issues arising out of the deliberations of the Charter
Council. The possibility of definitive outcomes in contentious issues tends
to lessen the institutional implications of the consensus requirement.
The Charter requires each financial institution to report on an annual
basis to the Charter Council on its progress in implementing the provisions
of the Charter.94 Financial institutions are required to publish an annual
report for general information. This annual report is to include an audited
scorecard and an account of the progress that the institution has made in
discharging the non-quantified responsibilities set out in the Charter.
95
Although the Charter is non-binding in a hard formal sense as it is a
'soft' document that sets aspirational goals and standards of conduct, yet
this does not undermine its importance. The primary value of the Charter
lies in the voluntary assumption by private parties of part of the responsi-
bility for making transformation work within a framework of collaboration
and partnership with the public sector. Already, the Charter parties have
begun to implement some of the provisions of the Charter in relation to the
expansion of financial services to low and moderate income households. In
recent times, some of the major banks have begun to open operating units
in townships and remote rural areas. 96 An important development in this
regard, was the creation and launch on October 25, 2004 of the Mzantsi
Account by the major banks together with Postbank (a government institu-
91 See above n 84 at 1 15.1.1. 92 ibid.
93 ibid. 94 See above n 84, at 15.2.1.
95 See above n 84, at 1 15.2.4.
96 John Reed, 'SA Takes Banks to the Townships: Banks are Responding to Laws at
Correcting South Africa's Racially Skewed Financial Sector', Financial Times, 12 Oct 2004.
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tion). The Mzantsi Account is designed specifically to meet the needs of
previously ignored communities. 9 7 The first set of quantitative data on the
Mzantsi Account suggests that that it is a runaway success. According to
the data, as at February 2005, over half a million Mzantsi Accounts had
been opened. Furthermore, an average of six thousand accounts was being
opened across the country each day.
98
In sum, the adoption of the Charter and the apparent impetus of the
Sector to implement its provisions and to collaborate with the Government
in its implementation within a framework of partnership are a vindication
of the Government's partnership seeking approach in dealing with the
banking sector to achieve the extension of financial services and housing
finance to low to moderate income borrowers/depositors. The initiatives of
the financial sector based on the Charter initially have proven successful
and indicate a real potential for the meaningful extension of financial
services.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: THE NEED FOR A SUITABLE LEGAL-
INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLICY REORIENTATION
The world of the IFIs/RFIs has historically been a world of economists (a
large portion of who are macro-economists): law and lawyers traditionally
have played a very minimal role. But the IFIs/RFIs have come to learn and
to appreciate incrementally during the 1990s the importance of the legal-
institutional infrastructural framework of a country in supporting the
domestic financial system by establishing the requisite institutional and
administrative capacities; in developing the desired supporting linkages
between the public and private sectors; in putting in place clear rights,
responsibilities and liabilities of parties in a transaction; in maintaining the
appropriate incentives and adequate information that espouse market
forces; and in providing adequate and fair means to enforce legal obliga-
tions and claims effectively.
This author recognizes that over the past decade institutions such as the
World Bank and the IMF have expended considerable efforts on 'deepen-
ing' financial sector legal-institutional infrastructure reform in developing
countries (eg, as to the legal aspects focusing on the importance of property
and contract rights and remedies, secured transactions, corporate gover-
97 Media Release, The Banking Council of S Aft, Mzantsi will Put Full Service Banking
within 15KM of the Vast Majority of South Africans (15 Oct 2004), available at http'l/www.
banking.org.za (accessed 15 Nov 2006).
98 Media Release, The Banking Council of S. Aft, The First Set of Data Shows Mzantsi Hit
the Spot (9 Feb 2005), available at http://www.banking.org.za. (accessed 15 Nov 20061.
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nance and corporate and bank insolvency;9 9 and as to the institutional
aspects focusing on modern administrative, enforcement and judicial
bodies).10 0 Such legal-institutional infrastructural reforms are indeed a
prerequisite to having a sound foundation for building a viable financial
sector. However, these reforms do not take into consideration from a devel-
opmental perspective what a country wishes its financial system to
embrace, what base of participants the country wishes to include and what
policies, institutions and additional legal infrastructure will be needed to
achieve these developmental objectives.
For the legal system to achieve these objectives, certainly key legislation
needs to be put into place: ie, at a minimum, modern contract, corporate,
bankruptcy, private property and commercial laws, as well as modern
banking and investment securities laws (and, even, most probably, a basic
asset securitization law). These latter legal provisions specifically governing
financial activities need to be 'rule-based' and transparent while preserving
a required degree of flexibility necessary to adapt to innovations and chang-
ing market conditions. The financial legislation/regulation should promul-
gate disclosure of information so as to enable market forces to discipline the
activities of financial institutions and 'market players'. Clarity of entry and
exit standards of financial institutions reduces uncertainty within the finan-
cial markets. In addition, a 'well-defined' exit policy is especially impera-
tive, since this is the time when the market is likely to act rashly and to
cause self-fulfilling bank runs. 101
In addition, administrative and judicial procedures need to be sufficiently
clear and to be backed-up with quality enforcement entailed to them. The
problem for many emerging economies is the lack of any effective adminis-
tration and enforcement. Thus, ensuring that enforcement is carried out
extends the appropriate incentives for market participants to act norma-
tively. Two specific priorities are seen as improving the enforcement of
financial contracts:
(1) Effective means to take possession of collateral exist; and
(2) Revision and updating of legal codes are carried out to reflect new
market realities.
99 See, eg, World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor
Rights Systems (Apr 2001) at worldbank.orgrifa/Insolvency Principles and Guidelines April
2001.pdf (accessed 23 Oct 2006);
100 eg, in the latter part of the 1990s and currently, the World Bank has been most active in
the area of judicial reform. Professor MacLean was a driving force behind this initiative.
101 See, eg, the work of the IADI (www.iadi.org) and also of the World Bank on bank inso-
lency principles (see Ernesto Aguirre, World Bank/IMF Global Bank Insolvency Initiative
(2002) at worldbank.org/finance../Aguirre--global.bk-insolvjinit-ppt.pdf ). (each accessed
19 Oct 2006).
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The lack of legal remedies in the case of non-compliance also can paralyse
the functioning of the market and can discourage foreigners from investing
in emerging markets. The uncertainty surrounding the outcome of legal
procedures and processes also inhibits the robustness of financial
markets. 102
Other key components for building 'modern' international financial best
practices/standards might well include the following:
10 3





" International Surveillance, Oversight and Data Assembly and
Dissemination
" Sound Regulation and Supervision
" Market Discipline
" Sound Accounting Standards and Practices.
All these reform components serve to strengthen and to deepen the stabil-
ity base of the pre-existing financial sector, which in reality is only repre-
sentative of the top of to economic-social pyramid. However, they are not
designed in themselves to broaden the financial sector base.
As mentioned above, the G-7/8 views the 'robustness' of a financial
system as an essential characteristic of a stable system. To promote this, the
G10 Working Group has identified three crucial actions that should be
taken by each country according to their specific situation:
(1) Creation of an institutional setting and financial infrastructure
necessary for a sound 'credit culture' and effective market function-
ing;
(2) Promotion of the functioning of markets so that owners, directors,
investors and other actual and potential stakeholders exercise
adequate discipline over financial institutions; and
(3) Creation of regulatory and supervisory arrangements that comple-
ment and support the operation of market discipline.
1°4
102 cf inter alia, John Hewko, Foreign Direct Investment: Does the Rule of Law Matter?,
Carnegie Endowment Working Paper Series No 26 (Carnegie, Washington DC, 2002); and
Jeswald W, Salacuse, 'From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role of
Law in the Third World', 33 Int'l Law 875 (1999).
103 See Norton, Emerging Markets, above n 7, ch 2. Cf. FSF, Compendium of Standards at
httpi/www.fsforum.org/compendium/about.html. (accessed 19 Oct 2006).
104 Inter alia, Working Party on Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies, Financial
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This would entail the improvement of the infrastructural aspects of the
financial system: namely, the legal and judicial framework, accounting and
disclosure standards, and the market structure. When viewed in this way,
financial legal sector reform becomes a deep, complex and long-term
matrix of reform efforts, presenting truly awesome challenges for and
demands up the 1FI resources and personnel at a time when they were being
pressured to react to ongoing, immediate financial crises. 10 5 Yet, again the
deepness of this reform process is not directed toward broadening the
reform base to be more inclusionary as to access and otherwise as to serv-
ing true developmental objectives.
It now seems self-evident for those who have been involved with the
financial sector reform area what is rightly asserted by Claessens and
Perotti:
The relationships between inequality and finance seem to become clearer
at the beginning of the 21st Century. Important research conducted so
far has suggested that to reduce inequality, financial systems need to be
broadened not only deepened.. .. Financial reform will only reduce
inequality . . . if it improves access for more individuals with growth
opportunities. Reforms thus need to broaden, not just deepen financial
systems.
10 6
Certainly, in logically and pragmatically following through on Sen's para-
digm of 'choice (freedom) and development', choice presupposes meaning-
ful and effective 'access'. 10 7 This, in turn, presupposes the existence of
suitable supporting governmental policies and financial sector infrastruc-
ture, which presumes, in turn, the presence of appropriate, supporting poli-
cies, institutions, legal infrastructure and legal instruments.
However, the need 'to broaden' is not simply about creating greater
access for the currently disenfranchised population to the financial system,
but needs also to be about broadening the financial system itself so that it
is not structurally geared only to the elite economic, business and social
elements of a developing country's society, but is also systemically struc-
tured in terms of suitable development policy to provide appropriate insti-
tutions, laws and instruments to accommodate the poor, low-income and
Stability in Emerging Economies: A strategy for the formulation, adoption and implementa-
tion of sound principles and practices to strengthen financial systems (Apr 1997) [G10 Report
on Financial Stability], at 3-4.
105 See, eg, early discussion of the problems in J Norton and M Andenas, Emerging Financial
Markets and the Role of International Financial Organizations (Kluwer,1996).
106 See Stijn Claessens and Enrico Perrotti, The link between finance and inequality: chan-
nels and evidence--background paper for the 2005 World Development Report (University of
Amsterdam, 2005).
107 See Amaryta Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: First Anchor, 2000).
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other excluded elements of the country's population. For instance, it
becomes critical to identify the particular sectors of a society that need
priority development (eg agriculture, small business, housing, social safety
net components etc), to assess the extent the existing financial sector and
institutions might be better utilized in furthering such developmental objec-
tives and the best means thereof, and to determine what new institutions,
laws, regulations and instruments might be required. To achieve all this in
a coherent, sequenced and long-term sustained manner is indeed an enor-
mous challenge for any country and for the supporting IFIs/RFIs.
But, without having a financial system that is relevant to a country's
developmental stage and objectives and that is designed to bring in and to
serve the excluded in meaningful ways, a country's financial system can not
effectively contribute to optimum, meaningful and sustainable economic
and social development and can not provide a broad, stable financial plat-
form for achieving financial stability with robust and sustained growth in
the financial sector. At the end of the day, economic legal development,
whether in the banking sector or otherwise, is about people and attempting
to better their lives and to bring a greater degree of social justice to the soci-
ety.
